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aFghanistan 2020: the us-taliban peace deal, intra-aFghan talKs 
and regional iMplications  
Filippo Boni
The Open University
Filippo.Boni@Open.ac.uk
The year 2020 was a landmark year for Afghanistan. The country witnessed the 
signing of the peace deal between the US and the Taliban as well as the beginning 
of intra-Afghan negotiations that, for the first time since 2001, brought together 
representatives from the Taliban and the Government of Afghanistan. These two po-
litical milestones occurred in parallel to the long-delayed final announcement of the 
September 2019 Presidential elections results. This was followed by a power-sharing 
agreement signed on 17 May, which ended the political impasse deriving from the 
contested electoral outcome. In Afghanistan, like in all other countries in the world, 
the COVID-19 pandemic had a major impact on the country’s economy and on peo-
ple’s livelihood. Despite a prompt government response and the implementation of 
some very tough lockdown rules, Afghanistan’s weak health system and very limited 
testing capacity meant that the real scale of the negative impact of the pandemic was 
massive, albeit difficult to capture. With regards to Afghanistan’s international rela-
tions, the year under examination was characterized by continuity in the approach 
that regional powers, Pakistan, India and above all China, had towards Kabul. 
Each of these countries has continued supporting their preferred actors on the Afghan 
political scene, but the peace deal between the US and the Taliban has put Pakistan 
in a strong position, given the long-standing support that Islamabad provided to the 
fundamentalist Islamic militia. 
KeyWords – Afghanistan 2020; US-Taliban peace deal; power-sharing; peace 
process.
1. Introduction
After years of profound uncertainty deriving from contested parliamentary 
and presidential electoral results, alongside a lack of progress on the way 
forward in dealing with the Taliban, 2020 represented a breakthrough on a 
number of fronts. First, the US-Taliban peace deal was the culmination of a 
long negotiating process between Washington and the Taliban leaders, after 
nearly 20 years of war. While the implementation of the agreement has met 
some obstacles in the immediate aftermath, such an accord was a precondi-
tion for Afghan stakeholders – the Taliban and the elected government – to 
kick-start the intra-Afghan talks, aimed at defining the country’s political 
and social future. Second, the presidential election results were eventually 
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announced and, despite political infighting in the ensuing months, by the 
end of the year a power-sharing government was in place, the cabinet largely 
approved, and the High Council for National Reconciliation (HCNR) was 
established to oversee the peace process with the Taliban. Beyond Afghani-
stan’s borders, the regional context was crucially important in determining 
Kabul’s foreign policy outlook in the year under examination. The Afghan 
leadership sought support for the ongoing peace talks from all major re-
gional stakeholders, including India, Pakistan, China and Iran, as well as 
from Central Asian Republics and Russia. It should be said that most of these 
countries officially reiterated their support for the talks. In fact, there was 
continuity in the policies adopted by regional powers in the Afghan scenario, 
primarily aimed at supporting their preferred actors in the peace process. 
In order to shed light on the dynamics sketched out in this cursory 
overview of major developments, this article proceeds as follows. Section 2 
looks at the dynamics set in motion by the announcement of the presiden-
tial election results, with specific focus on the issues behind the formation 
of the new cabinet and the establishment of the High Council for National 
Reconciliation. Section 3 delves into the US-Taliban peace deal and looks at 
the intra-Afghan talks that followed in September. Section 4 addresses the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the country’s economy, and the way 
in which the government handled the situation in the country. Section 5 
analyzes Afghanistan’s international relations, with specific focus on Kabul’s 
relations with Islamabad, New Delhi and Beijing. 
2. Presidential election results and cabinet formation
Almost five months after the September 2019 presidential elections, on 18th 
February 2020 the incumbent President Ashraf Ghani was declared the win-
ner of the presidential vote, the final results of which were announced by the 
Independent Election Commission.1 
Table 1 – Afghanistan Presidential Election Result
Candidate Number of Votes Share of votes (%)
Mohammad Ashraf Ghani 923,592 50.64
Dr. Abdullah Abdullah 720,841 39.52
Gulbedin Hekmatyar 70,241 3.85
Rahmatullah Nabil 33,919 1.86
Source: Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan, ‘Afghanistan 2019 Presidential 
Election’ (http://www.iec.org.af/results/en/home/final_votes).
1.  For an analysis of the issues that led to the delay in the announcement, see: 
Filippo Boni, ‘Afghanistan 2019: Between peace talks and presidential elections, an-
other year of uncertainty’, Asia Maior, XXIX/2019, pp. 435-449. 
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Although Ashraf Ghani praised «the brave women of Afghanistan who 
made up 31% of the turnout in the elections» and was calling for all parties 
to «come to unite our country», the other presidential candidates, listed in 
Table 1 with their respective vote count, rejected the results.2 Reminiscent 
of the disputed 2014 elections, runner-up and former Chief Executive Dr 
Abdullah Abdullah, claimed that he was the winner «based on clean votes» 
and that he was going to «form the inclusive government».3 While not claim-
ing victory, other prominent presidential candidates echoed Abdullah’s sen-
timents. Rahmatullah Nabil, former director of the National Directorate of 
Security, decried the «death of democracy» and termed the election results as 
«fraudulent», while simultaneously calling for a «reconciliation government».4 
Similarly, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of the Islamist Hizb-e-Islami party, 
opposed the creation of a parallel government, but called for «an inclusive 
government where all see themselves represented, including the Taliban».5
The lack of acceptance of the electoral result, and the political frag-
mentation that ensued, had permeated political developments in the ensu-
ing months around a number of key areas, including: a) finding a way out 
of the political impasse; b) cabinet formation; c) and the establishment of a 
High Council for National Reconciliation, tasked with supervising the peace 
process with the Taliban. 
With regards the political impasse, its most visible manifestation were 
the parallel ceremonies of Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah. Both can-
didates had signalled their intention to press ahead with the swearing in 
ceremonies in the immediate aftermath of the announcement of results in 
February. It was only because of the intervention by US Special Envoy for 
Afghanistan Reconciliation, Zalmay Khalilzad, that the presidential taking 
of office was pushed back to 9 March.6 Despite attempts until the very last 
minute by Khalilzad to avert the parallel swearing-in ceremonies, these 
eventually took place. Interestingly, US officials and European Union dip-
lomats attended Ghani’s ceremony of taking the oath of office, a move that 
clearly strengthened Ghani’s position in the power struggle with Adbullah. 
The two candidates managed to reach an agreement on 17 May 20207. The 
2.  ‘We have Come to Unite Our Nation: Ghani’, Tolo News, 19 February 2019.
3.  ‘Abdullah Rejects Results, Announces Formation of «Inclusive Govt»’, Tolo 
News, 18 February 2020.
4.  ‘Nabil Suggests «Reconciliation Govt,» Rejects Election Results’, Tolo News, 
20 February 2020. 
5.  ‘Hekmatyar Rejects Results: Ghani Chose «Path of Crisis»’, Tolo News, 19 
February 2020. 
6.  The postponement was agreed in order to pre-empt any major fall out in the 
political crisis, ahead of the signing of the historic agreement between the US and the 
Taliban in Doha at the end of February.
7.  Between the parallel taking office in March and the agreement in May, there 
have been three attempts at mediation carried out by: a group led by former pres-
ident Hamed Karzai; a parliamentary delegation of 40 MPs; and a delegation of 
senior female politicians. 
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deal envisaged a power-sharing cabinet and the establishment of a High 
Council for National Reconciliation, led by Dr Abdullah, to supervise the 
peace process.8 But even as an agreement was reached, the difficulties in 
forming a new government were far from over.
The shadow of the political impasse following the elections loomed 
large over cabinet formation, as mistrust and power struggles led to 
wrangling over the distribution of cabinet posts. As a result, it took Ghani 
almost seven months to finalize the list of his 25 cabinet nominees, who 
were placed before the Wolesi Jirga (lower house) for approval, as re-
quired by the Constitution. As of early December, the Wolesi Jirga ap-
proved 20 out of the 25 nominees. According to Wolesi Jirga Deputy 
Secretary Ojatullah Kheradmand, such widespread support may have 
derived from a desire to show unity vis-à-vis the Taliban as well as «to 
show a strong stance in the face of continuing violence across the country 
despite the ongoing talks».9 With 19 ministers and the director of the 
National Directorate of Security (NDS) formally confirmed, the govern-
ment was still to introduce four nominees for ministries and one for the 
central bank. However, given the difficulties faced in forming the cabinet, 
presidents tend to keep acting ministers in place even if they have been 
rejected by the Wolesi Jirga.10
The final contentious point was the establishment of the HCNR, 
whose formation was occurring simultaneously to that of the cabinet. The 
HCNR was envisaged to comprise a leadership committee and a general 
assembly. In August 2020, President Ghani nominated the 46 members of 
the leadership committee through a decree. This was nevertheless rejected 
by some of the key political figures, including Dr Abdullah, on the grounds 
that according to the 17 May power-sharing agreement it was Dr Abdullah’s 
right to lead the peace process and thereby appoint members of the HC-
NR.11 While this provides evidence of the very divided and factional nature 
of the Afghan political system, political infighting had important implica-
tions on the conduct of peace talks with the Taliban, that will be the focus 
of the next section. 
8.  ‘Ghani and Abdullah Sign Agreement to Break Political Deadlock’, Tolo News, 
17 May 2020.
9. Ali Yawar Adili & Rohullah Sorush, ‘Afghanistan’s New – But Still Incomplete 
Cabinet: No end yet to acting ministers’, Afghanistan Analysts Network, 6 December 2020.
10.  Ibid.
11.  Ali Yawar Adili, Peace Leadership: Power struggles, division and an incom-
plete council, Afghanistan Analysts Network, 6 September 2020.
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3. Towards peace in Afghanistan: the US-Taliban peace deal and intra-Afghan 
negotiations
The just described political impasse and wrangling among the major Af-
ghan political actors took place in parallel to negotiations between the US 
and the Taliban on a peace deal, eventually signed on 29 February.12 The 
deal came after 18 months of intense negotiations and deadlocks, and af-
ter nearly 20 years of war. Although the peace process in Afghanistan has 
only just begun, the agreement between the US and the Taliban is nothing 
short of historic. The main points of the «Agreement for Bringing Peace to 
Afghanistan» include: 
a) the US commitment to a phased withdrawal of all US and NATO 
troops from Afghanistan within 14 months of signing the accord; 
b) a pledge by the Taliban to prevent any group or individual from 
using Afghan soil to threaten the US and its allies;
c) the Taliban’s promise to sever ties with terrorist organizations inclu-
ding Al-Qāʿida;
d) a prisoner swap; 
e) the start of intra-Afghan negotiations;
f) sanctions removal.
In addition to the terms just outlined, the agreement also includes a 
number of secret annexes, whose undisclosed contents have raised concerns 
among members of the US Congress about their nature.13 Critics of the 
agreement have noted that the absence of the Afghan government from 
the US-Taliban talks epitomized the US’s desire to prioritize a military with-
drawal over a more articulated political settlement, preserving at least some 
of the social gains made in the country since 2001.14 
The Taliban’s position on the agreement was anticipated in a con-
troversial editorial published in the New York Times, in which the deputy 
leader of the Taliban, Sirajuddin Haqqani, outlined his organization’s views 
on the peace process as well as on the future of Afghanistan.15 In Haqqani’s 
12.  US State Department, ‘Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan be-
tween the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States 
as a state and is known as the Taliban and the United States of America’, 29 Febru-
ary 2020. Full text available here: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/
Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf. 
13.  Clayton Thomas, ‘Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief ’, Con-
gressional Research Service, R45122, Updated 10 November 2020. 
14.  Ibid.
15.  Sirajuddin Haqqani, ‘What the Taliban Want’, New York Times, 20 February 
2020. The editorial was controversial because Haqqani is a designated terrorist by the 
FBI and the State Department is offering a reward of up to $5 million for information 
leading to his arrest. For reaction to the editorial, see: John R. Allen, ‘Sirajuddin 
Haqqani, Terrorist’, Brookings Institution, 21 February 2020.
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view, once the country was «liberated from foreign domination and interfer-
ence», it would be possible to «find a way to build an Islamic system in which 
all Afghans have equal rights, where the rights of women that are granted 
by Islam – from the right to education to the right to work – are protected, 
and where merit is the basis for equal opportunity».16 
In the months immediately following the agreement, there were a 
number of stumbling blocks towards the implementation of the terms 
agreed between the Taliban and the US. On the one hand, the Afghan gov-
ernment resisted the release of Taliban detainees to which the US was com-
mitted under the accord; on the other hand, the insurgents continued to 
carry out acts of violence.17 Even though, according to the United Nations, 
civilian casualties were at their lowest since 2012 in the first nine months 
of 2020, the 6,000 casualties recorded were still very high and far from the 
Afghan government’s request for a permanent ceasefire.18 
Despite these difficulties, the Taliban and the Afghan government 
eventually agreed to start an historical peace process on 12 September in 
Doha. The first phase of the talks was aimed at formulating a «code of con-
duct», determining the rules that would guide the talks in the ensuing phas-
es. Some of the more formal points, including starting each session with a 
recitation of the Quran, ending with prayers, and treating each other with 
respect, were agreed very quickly. However, differences persisted around the 
way in which the future of Afghanistan should look like.19 Nevertheless, the 
two sides managed to reach an agreement on 2 December on the procedur-
al rules for the second phase of the talks, focused on key issues, including 
the very contentious definition of the role of Islam in the political setting 
expected to emerge from these talks.20 
Against such backdrop, how to reconcile the role of women in a soci-
ety with the Taliban’s radical interpretation of Islam has been a major point 
of contention, and one that is going to take centre stage in the issue-based 
phase of the talks. In an open letter to the Taliban, the Coalition of Afghan 
16.  Sirajuddin Haqqani, ‘What the Taliban Want’.
17.  ‘Keeping Intra-Afghan Talks on Track’, International Crisis Group, 30 Sep-
tember 2020. 
18.  United Nations Assistance Mission In Afghanistan, ‘Afghanistan: Protection 
Of Civilians In Armed Conflict - Third Quarter Report: 1 January To 30 September 
2020’, October 2020. 
19.  Lyse Doucet, ‘Afghan-Taliban peace talks: What’s next?’, BBC News, 22 Sep-
tember 2020. 
20.  ‘Doha Breakthrough: Afghan Negotiators Agree on Procedural Rules’, Tolo 
News, 2 December 2020. The two competing visions about the future of Afghanistan 
see on the one side the government willing to retain the post-Bonn Agreement consti-
tutional republic, and, on the opposite side, the Taliban envisioning an emirate with 
absolute executive authority. For a detailed discussion of the two positions, see: Muska 
Dastageer, ‘To succeed, intra-Afghan talks must defer to the non-ideal’, Atlantic Council, 
16 December 2020.
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Women has expressed concerns about the Taliban’s lack of clarity on the 
role that they envisage for women. The letter pointed out that «you have 
resisted explaining your interpretations of Shari ‘a and the Afghan tradi-
tions of which you speak. Respectfully, your interpretation is one of many». 
It also invited them to sit together in order to try to «overcome the polarized 
views» about the role of women and the country’s future.21 As human rights 
activist Wazhma Frogh eloquently put in an opinion piece for the CNN, 
«how will the Taliban, with their outdated and regressive rules, reconcile 
their beliefs with today’s Afghanistan?».22 In areas of Afghanistan still con-
trolled by the Taliban, women continue to be mistreated and deprived of ba-
sic rights, such as education and work outside the home. MP Fawzia Koofi, 
who was part of the team tasked with negotiating with the Taliban, reported 
how during meetings with the Taliban representatives she «told them that 
Afghanistan was now represented by diverse views and the country was not 
bound by one ideology», and that their view was that «a woman can become 
prime minister but not president. They also said women can’t be judges».23 
4. Afghanistan’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on the 
economy
Most of the key political developments discussed in the previous parts of this 
article occurred against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic, that hit 
the country amidst political uncertainty. Afghanistan’s first COVID-19 case 
was recorded on 24th February in the western province of Herat bordering 
Iran.24 Following the return of around 200,000 migrant workers from Iran 
after an outbreak in that country, all 34 Afghan provinces recorded cases 
shortly after.25 The Afghan government responded promptly to the outbreak 
by shutting down schools, universities, government offices and all non-es-
sential businesses in Kabul and provincial capitals. According to the Corona-
virus Government Response Tracker compiled by the University of Oxford, 
Afghanistan implemented some of the strictest measures, with the highest 
score at 84.26, on a scale from 0 to 100 in which 100 is the strictest. Compar-
ing Afghanistan’s response to that of China or Italy, two of the pandemic’s 
21.  ‘Open Letter By Afghan Women To The Taliban’, 13 August 2020 (https://
afghanistanpeacecampaign.org/2020/09/11/open-letter-by-afghan-women-to-the-
taliban). 
22.  Wazhma Frogh, ‘If the Taliban regain power, I could lose everything’, CNN 
Opinion, 26 February 2020.
23.  Swaminathan Natarajan, ‘Afghan peace talks: The woman who negotiated 
with the Taliban’, BBC News, 27 February 2020.
24.  ‘Afghanistan confirms first coronavirus case in province bordering Iran’, 
Reuters, 24 February 2020.
25.  Andrew Quilty, ‘Afghanistan’s unseen Covid crisis’, The Interpreter, 12 Au-
gust 2020. 
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hardest hit countries and toughest lockdowns, Italy has the highest score 
at 93/100 and China the second highest 81/100, in February 2020.26 While 
the government acted swiftly and with a strong set of measures, Afghani-
stan’s weak health system struggled to cope with the testing and hospital 
admissions arising from the growing numbers of COVID-19 patients. In Au-
gust 2020, Ahmad Jawad Osmani, the acting health minister, declared that 
around 10 million Afghans, roughly 31% of the population, were infected 
with the coronavirus.27 Given the limited testing capacity, with only six oper-
ational provincial labs, in addition to the 27 operating in Kabul at the end of 
September 2020, it is difficult to verify these figures.28 As of early December 
2020, only 154,603 people out of a population of 36.7 million were tested.29 
The impact of the pandemic on people’s livelihoods was dramatic. Ac-
cording to a report released in December 2020 by the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the World Health Organization, 
Afghanistan has the second highest number of people in emergency food 
insecurity in the world (5.5 million).30 Because of the unemployment deriving 
from the pandemic-related lockdowns, household debt has rapidly grown in 
terms of both the number of people in debt and the scale of that debt. Among 
the displaced households surveyed, for 53% the primary reason for taking on 
debt was to pay for food.31 The pandemic also heavily impacted the economy, 
due to the constraints imposed «on consumption, exports, and remittanc-
es».32 The Asian Development Bank (ADB) forecasts Afghanistan’s gross do-
mestic product (GDP) to contract by 5.0% in 2020, with a projected growth of 
1.5% in 2021. As ADB Country Director for Afghanistan, Narendra Singru, 
noted, «the economy could witness positive growth next year if the intra-Af-
ghan peace negotiations succeed and bring a speedy political settlement, in 
addition to stronger commitments from development partners at the upcom-
ing Afghanistan Conference 2020».33 Average inflation in the first 6 months 
of 2020 more than doubled from 2.5% a year earlier to 5.3%, and exports 
declined by 28% in the first half of 2020 from the same period in 2019.34 
26.  Thomas Hale et al., COVID-19 Government Response Tracker, Oxford: Blavat-
nik School of Government, 2020. 
27.  ‘«10M» COVID-19 Cases in Afghanistan: Health Ministry’, Tolo News, 5 
August 2020.
28.  Rohullah Sorush, ‘Covid-19 in Afghanistan (6): A closer look at the MoPH’s 
official figures’, Afghanistan Analysts Network, 24 September 2020.
29.  UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the World 
Health Organization, Afghanistan: Strategic Situation Report: COVID-19, No. 86, 3 De-
cember 2020.
30.  Ibid
31.  Ibid. 
32.  ‘The World Bank In Afghanistan – Overview’.
33.  Asian Development Bank, ‘Afghanistan’s GDP to Contract in 2020 Due to 
COVID-19; Small Recovery Projected for 2021’, News Release, 15 September 2020.
34.  Ibid. 
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5. The international relations of Afghanistan
Very much like its domestic politics, Afghanistan’s geopolitics in the year 
under examination were dominated by the implications of the peace deal 
between the US and the Taliban. The importance of the regional setting for 
the dynamics discussed here is demonstrated by Abdullah Abdullah’s sus-
tained attempts at seeking regional support for the peace process, testified 
by the visits he made between September and November 2020 to Pakistan, 
India, Iran, and Uzbekistan.35 On a more granular level, the peace deal, 
and the subsequent intra-Afghan talks, provided Pakistan with a favourable 
policy framework, one in which the Taliban are a recognized stakeholder in 
deciding the future of Afghanistan. While this certainly favours Pakistan’s 
approach to the country, it has somewhat undermined India’s policy to-
wards Afghanistan, one that sees New Delhi engaging almost exclusively 
with the elected government in Kabul. Between the diverging approaches 
adopted by India and Pakistan, China continued in what can be defined as 
a hedging approach, seeking to maintain stable relations with the Afghan 
government, while simultaneously engaging with the Taliban. 
5.1. India and Pakistan in Afghanistan
India’s approach to Afghanistan in 2020 continued along the main objec-
tive that characterized its policy in previous decades, namely balancing Pa-
kistan’s influence in the country. To this end, New Delhi has supported the 
elected government in Kabul, also trying to use Afghanistan as a corridor 
to Central Asia, in order to outflank Pakistan. Not much progress was made 
in 2020 on either front.
During the political impasse discussed above, New Delhi strongly op-
posed the parallel taking office of Ghani and Abdullah, throwing its weight 
behind the former. It did so for a number of reasons: one was the fact that 
«Ghani enjoys relatively more US support than Abdullah, [and he] has a 
team that India can trust to secure its interests better»; another was that 
New Delhi could not afford having its horse in the peace process weakened 
by factional politics when confronting the Taliban.36 India’s support for the 
elected representatives in Afghanistan was reiterated during Abdullah Ab-
dullah’s visit to New Delhi in October 2020, during which the chairman of 
the High Council for National Reconciliation noted how India’s National 
Security Adviser Ajit Doval, «stated that his country is in favour [of] an in-
dependent, democratic, sovereign & peaceful Afghanistan, where no ter-
35.  United Nations Assistance Mission In Afghanistan, Report to the Secretary 
General: The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 
A/75/634–S/2020/1182, 9 December 2020. 
36.  Avinash Paliwal, ‘India must support its allies in Kabul’, The Hindustan 
Times, 24 February 2020.
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rorists can operate».37 While India’s policy consistency has certainly won 
New Delhi some good will among key Afghan political leaders, Pakistan’s 
superior influence in the wider US-Taliban peace process was evident. The 
Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi was present in Doha 
at the signing of the US-Taliban peace deal, a clear signal of Islamabad’s 
centrality in reaching this agreement.38 Importantly, India was represented 
by its Ambassador to Qatar.39 
Beyond the peace process, India also attempted to turn Afghanistan 
into an access point to Central Asian markets in an effort to circumvent 
Pakistan. The most visible manifestation of this strategy has been India’s 
investment in the Iranian port of Chahbahar, aimed at balancing Chinese 
investment in the Pakistani port of Gwadar. But on this front too, there was 
limited progress. In January 2020, the Gwadar port officially started tak-
ing cargo under the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APT-
TA), the first time that the port was being used for goods to the Afghan 
market. This was an important development as one of the motives behind 
the development of Chabahar has been to remove the monopoly of Af-
ghan trade from Pakistan. By providing an additional port, Gwadar aims 
to gain an advantage over Chabahar in terms of trade relations with Af-
ghanistan. The importance that Gwadar has for Pakistan’s policy vis-à-vis 
Afghanistan was clearly stated by the Pakistani Foreign Minister Qureshi 
in December 2020: «Gwadar Port can be helpful […]. We want to make 
trade agreements more active to promote bilateral trade between Pakistan 
and Afghanistan».40 
While India saw its position weakened as a result of the developments 
in 2020, Pakistan witnessed the materialization of its ideal policy scenario/
framework. Islamabad’s role in the Afghan theatre was central throughout 
2020, and the signing of the US-Taliban peace deal was largely regarded as 
a success for Pakistan, since it legitimized its preferred interlocutor – the 
Taliban – at the negotiating table with the Afghan government. This point 
was also made clear by a report produced for the US Congress by the Lead 
Inspector General Defense for Overseas Contingency Operations (namely 
the joint agency initiative charged with oversighting overseas contingency 
operations), which noted that Pakistan «views increased Taliban influence 
in Afghanistan as supporting its overall objectives and will seek to influence 
37.  ‘NSA Ajit Doval meets Afghan peace negotiator Abdullah Abdullah in Del-
hi’, The Hindustan Times, 7 October 2020. 
38.  ‘US-Taliban peace deal: Qureshi to represent Pakistan at Doha ceremony 
today’, The News International, 29 February 2020.
39.  ‘India to attend U.S.-Taliban peace deal ceremony in Doha’, The Hindu, 28 
February 2020. 
40.  ‘Qureshi welcomes Taliban team in Islamabad, reiterates Pakistan’s desire 
for durable Afghan peace’, Dawn, 16 December 2020. 
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intra-Afghan peace talks in a direction favourable to Pakistan».41 While the 
political leadership played an important role, as testified by the Foreign 
Minister’s presence in Doha at the signing of the agreement, Pakistan’s pow-
erful military retained its centrality in these dynamics. US Ambassador Zal-
may Khalilzad met with the Pakistani chief of Army Staff (COAS), General 
Qamar Javed Bajwa eight times between January 2020 and January 2021.42 
In addition, the Pakistani COAS visited Afghanistan in June, and met with 
President Ghani and Adbullah Abdullah to reiterate Pakistan’s support to 
the ongoing peace process.43 
The second half of 2020 was characterized by three major develop-
ments in Pakistan-Afghanistan ties: first, Abdullah Abdullah’s visit to Paki-
stan in September; second, Prime Minister Imran Khan’s visit to Afghan-
istan in November, the first since he took office following the July 2018 
elections; third, a delegation of the Afghan Taliban visiting Islamabad in 
December, during the break agreed in the intra-Afghan talks. As for Ab-
dullah’s visit, this came shortly after the preliminary phase of the peace 
talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban had started. The visit 
served to cement some marginal improvements in the bilateral ties between 
the two countries, with Abdullah acknowledging that Pakistan «played an 
important role in the Afghan peace process» and advocating for «fresh ap-
proaches toward peace».44 With regards to the Pakistani Prime Minister’s vis-
it to Kabul, the main result was the issuing of the document «Shared Vision 
between Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 
to Support Peace and Stability in Both Countries and the Wider Region»,45 
that was calling the two sides to develop a «special relationship», as well as to 
41.  Office of Inspector General, United States Department of Defense, Oper-
ation Freedom’s Sentinel. Lead Inspector General Report To The United States Congress, 1 
January 2020 ‒ 31 March 2020, pp. 1-88.
42.  The visits took place in January, April, May, June, October, November, and 
December 2020 and in early January 2021. ‘Pakistan reiterates backing for US efforts 
for Afghan peace’, Dawn, 15 April 2020; ‘Pakistan, US review Afghan peace process’, 
Dawn, 8 June 2020; ‘Khalilzad discusses Afghan peace process with Bajwa’, Dawn, 9 
October 2020; ‘US envoy Khalilzad calls on COAS to discuss Afghan peace process, 
regional security situation’, Dawn, 2 November 2020; ‘Top US officials hold talks with 
Pakistan army chief Gen Bajwa’, Gulf News, 15 December 2020; ‘Pakistan, US reaffirm 
pledge to work for Afghan peace’, Dawn, 5 January 2021.
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News, 9 June 2020.
44.  ‘Abdullah Abdullah emphasizes ‘drawing lessons from realities of past four 
decades’, The Express Tribune, 29 September 2020.
45.  Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Shared Vision between 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and Islamic Republic of Pakistan, to Support Peace and Sta-
bility in Both Countries and the Wider Region, 19 November 2020 (http://mofa.gov.pk/
shared-vision-between-islamic-republic-of-afghanistan-and-islamic-republic-of-paki-
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develop trade and connectivity.46 Finally, the visit by the Taliban delegation 
to Islamabad in December 2020 was testament to the importance that Paki-
stan played in the Afghan peace process and a further attempt at projecting 
Pakistan as an indispensable mediator in the talks between the Taliban and 
the Afghan government. 
5.2. China’s hedging towards Afghanistan
After years in which China’s role in Afghanistan had increased significantly 
in 2020, complicit in the crucial role played by the US in the signing of the 
peace deal with the Taliban, China has been a less visible actor than in previ-
ous years. During the year under examination, Beijing has taken a backseat 
in what was a US-dominated year, with an eye on preserving its security 
interests – most notably the internal stability of Xinjiang47 – and cultivating 
relations with both the Taliban and the elected government. The rationale 
behind Beijing’s hedging between these two actors in the Afghan theatre, 
stems from a clear-eyed assessment about the difficulties, as noted above, in 
the intra-Afghan peace talks, as well as from the legitimization of the Talib-
an as a key political interlocutor in the future of Afghanistan.48 In addition, 
China can also rely on its close ties with Pakistan, and the latter’s leverage 
over the insurgent organization to advance its interests. As a testament of 
the close coordination between Islamabad and Beijing on this matter, in 
September 2020, China’s special envoy for Afghanistan, Ambassador Liu 
Jian, met Taliban leader Mullah Baradar in Doha and, only five days later, 
Pakistan’s special representative for Afghanistan, Ambassador Mohammad 
Sadiq. During the meeting, Liu expressed the support of China for the Af-
ghan peace process.49
With regards to the US-Taliban peace deal, China’s Foreign Ministry 
Spokesperson Zhao Lijian stated that China welcomed the agreement. He 
also added that «foreign troops in Afghanistan should withdraw in an order-
ly and responsible way to ensure a smooth transition» to prevent «a security 
vacuum, which terrorist organizations may take advantage of».50 China was 
one of the countries that congratulated President Ghani after his taking 
46.  ‘Pakistan will do everything possible to reduce violence in Afghanistan, says 
PM Imran on maiden Kabul visit’, Dawn, 19 November 2020.
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March 2020. 
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office on 9 March, «calling on all parties in Afghanistan to prioritize the 
interests of the country and the people, forge consensus, and facilitate the 
process of peaceful reconstruction and reconciliation».51 A similar message 
was delivered at the end of the 3rd round of the China-Afghanistan-Pakistan 
Trilateral Vice Foreign Ministers’ Strategic Dialogue, held online in July. In 
this occasion, the three countries essentially reiterated their commitment 
to the Afghan peace process, with Pakistan and China hoping that intra-Af-
ghan peace talks would start soon.52
Afghanistan also featured as part of Beijing’s «masks diplomacy» dur-
ing the pandemic. In a piece titled «A Brother in Weal and Woe, China Aids 
Afghanistan with Medical Supplies», Chinese Ambassador to Afghanistan 
Wang Yu, emphatically praised the Sino-Afghan friendship that «stems from 
the mountains and rivers connecting us but also is rooted in the fearlessness 
and solidarity of two ancient civilizations through difficulties and dangers». 
The Chinese Ambassador thanked those Afghans who had helped China 
at the height of the pandemic. He then went on remembering the medical 
supplies, including protective equipment, ventilators and face masks, that 
Beijing had provided once the pandemic hit Afghanistan. He concluded his 
piece remarking that «China is making great effort to contribute its part to 
the world’s fight against the pandemic with a high sense of responsibility».53 
This was in line with similar messages that Chinese Diplomats and state 
media have projected across countries in Asia and Europe, in what has been 
dubbed as «face masks» diplomacy.
6. Conclusion
The two landmark events that characterized Afghanistan’s political devel-
opments in 2020, namely the US-Taliban peace deal and the beginning of 
intra-Afghan talks, represent key stepping stones on which to build the fu-
ture of Afghanistan. The very fact that the Taliban and the government 
in Kabul have sat across the same table and started talking to each other 
through an institutional consultation mechanism, represented an impor-
tant start to a negotiating process that will define the country’s social and 
political contours for years to come. As the two sides embark on the second 
phase of the talks, there are a number of issues that cast some uncertainty 
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term’, Xinhua, 10 March 2020. 
52.  Kamran Yousaf, ‘Pakistan, China, Afghanistan seek «orderly» US withdraw-
al to prevent terror resurgence’, The Express Tribune, 7 July 2020; Ministry of Foreign 
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on the unfolding of the process. First, the Taliban signalled that they are not 
willing to abandon the use of violence, what has been defined as a «fight-
and-talk strategy», as the use of violence represents the group’s main source 
of leverage at the negotiating table.54 Second, the Taliban and the Afghan 
government are still very much anchored in their positions, and a break-
through will require compromises and some concessions that neither side 
seems to be prepared to concede. Finally, from a geopolitical point of view, 
it is important to consider how the new Biden presidency is going to impact 
the US’s commitment to the process. 
54.  Abdul Qadir Sediqi, ‘Fight and talk: Facing negotiations, Taliban almost 
took key Afghan city’, Reuters, 14 September 2020. 
